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Over the past fifteen years, countries around the world have embraced global markets.  
This has required a concomitant increase in commitments to policies to promote effective 
global competition.  Within this context, many have questioned the long-standing practice of 
providing exemptions from national antitrust laws so that firms can cooperate in their export 
activities.  Nine countries have eliminated such exemptions over the last decade (Levenstein 
and Suslow 2005, Table 3).  This paper contributes to this discussion by providing an 
empirical analysis of the largest extant “export cartel” exemption policy, that offered by the 
United States’ Export Trading Company Act (1982).1 
The U.S. Congress passed the Export Trading Company Act (ETC Act) in 1982 in 
response to concern that American firms were at a disadvantage in international markets, 
especially relative to Japanese firms that were encouraged to cooperate by government 
agencies such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.  At the time of the passage 
of the ETC Act, the United States already had legislation that offered exporters an antitrust 
exemption under the 1918 Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act (WP Act).  Like the WP Act, 
the ETC Act provides a limited immunity from U.S. antitrust laws to firms that engage in 
joint in export activities, while joint activity that affects the U.S. domestic market is still 
prohibited.  Neither the ETC Act nor the WP Act provides any protection from foreign 
antitrust prosecution.  While the WP Act remains law, the number of WP associations has 
fallen from thirty-nine in 1982 to only seven in 2005.2  In contrast, 198 ETC exemption 
certificates were granted between the issuance of the first certificate on October 26, 1983 and 
May of 2006.  Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative number of ETCs from 1983 to 2004 (our 
                                                 
1 We use the term “export cartel” for convenience to indicate a group of firms granted permission to engage in 
the types of activities known to cartels, such as fixing prices.  This it is not meant to imply that all such export 
cartels or export associations are able to exercise market power.  
2 Victor (1992), p. 573, reports that “[b]y 1982, the year that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act...and 
Export Trading Company Act...were enacted, only thirty-nine registered Webb associations existed...”  As of 
May 2005 (the most recent data), only seven WP Associations remain:  American Cotton Exporters Association, 
American Natural Soda Ash Corporation, American European Soda Ash Shipping Association, California Dried 
Fruit Export Association, Overseas Distribution Solutions, Paperboard Export Association of the United States, 
and Phosphate Chemicals Export Association.  See http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/webbpomerene/index.htm.  
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sample period), and the number of ETCs granted each year, respectively.  There are currently 
78 active ETCs.3 
There are two distinct issues raised by the controversy regarding export exemptions.  First, 
do these exemptions actually lead to increases in the value of exports?  Second, if they do 
increase exports, is this an increase in “mutually beneficial trade” or is it simply a transfer 
from the importing countries’ consumers to the exporting countries’ producers through the 
exercise of market power (as well as potentially creating a deadweight loss to society at 
large)?  In other words, do these export exemptions facilitate the creation of “hard-core” 
cartels that have the ability to fix prices or allocate markets?4  Or, as has been argued, do they 
allow members to share the fixed costs of marketing, transportation, and finance necessary to 
participate in international markets, thereby increasing competition in international markets 
and giving global consumers more choices?5  Or, as others have concluded, do they have little 
or no impact at all?6 
Small firms, especially in countries that have only a small share of the global market, are 
unlikely to be able to use export exemptions to exercise market power.  Even export 
associations that are able to exercise market power may also share the fixed costs of 
exporting.  As was argued by the U.S. representative at a meeting of the WTO’s Working 
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy:7 
...so-called “export cartels”... typically were conceived as mechanisms for 
domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in effective export 
activity acting individually.  As such, they often had pro-competitive 
effects in that they added additional players to the relevant markets and 
might bring innovation or lower prices.  Moreover, they were not secret 
and therefore did not bear the hallmarks of what was traditionally 
considered to be a hardcore cartel. 
                                                 
3 Email correspondence with Jeffrey Anspacher, Director, Export Trading Company Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, May 26, 2006.  ETCs can be revoked by the Department of Commerce or voluntarily relinquished 
by the companies involved, as explained in detail below. 
4 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) introduced the terminology “hard core 
cartels” in a 1998 report to refer to private cooperative agreements to set prices or allocate markets.  OECD 
(1998), p. 3. 
5 See, for example, Dick (1992), p. 90-91. 
6 See, for example, Waller (1997). 
7 WORLD TRADE ORG., REP. OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION 
POLICY, W.T.O. Doc. WT/WGTCP/M21 (May 26, 2003) par. 37, p. 15. 
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The empirical task, then, is to provide an answer to a somewhat more nuanced version of the 
question posed above: do these exemptions increase exports, and if so, when and by whom? 
Although many countries offer exemptions for export activity, either explicitly—such as 
Australia and Canada—or implicitly—as is the case for almost all members of the European 
Union—we focus in this article on the economic effects of ETCs granted by U.S. law.8  We 
do this for the simple reason that the U.S. is the only country for which we have been able to 
find data amenable to statistical analysis.9  In order to conduct even a relatively aggregate-
level study of the effect on exports of granting exemptions for joint export activity, one needs 
to know the products produced by firms granted these exemptions.  This information is 
publicly available in the U.S. for most ETCs in the Federal Register, where all ETC 
applications are published, as required by law.10  The U.S. experience is unique in many 
ways, and the results presented here may not be applicable to firms in smaller or less-
developed countries.   Still, as the only empirical analysis of the economic effects of 
contemporary export cartel exemptions, it provides useful statistical grounding for policy 
discussions.   
We first survey the legal status of exemptions for export activity around the world and 
present the limited evidence that exists on the use of these exemptions by exporting firms.  
We then discuss the specific nature of the exemptions provided by the ETC Act (since they 
differ in several ways from the older WP Act).  Then, in providing descriptive statistics on the 
195 ETCs granted from 1983 through 2004, we attempt to give an accurate picture of the 
types of firms that apply for these certificates and the nature of the restrictions placed upon 
them by the Department of Commerce, which administers the ETC Act, and the Department 
of Justice, which reviews all applications.  Regression analysis is used to analyze whether 
industries in which ETCs have been granted have higher growth in exports.   
                                                 
8 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005) for a discussion of the status of antitrust exemptions for exporters 
throughout the world, and the associated notification requirements. 
9 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005), pp. 795-96 for a discussion of data available on export associations from 
competition agencies in other countries. 
10 After the application is published in the Federal Register, there is a waiting period of ninety days during which 
the public is invited to comment. 
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We find that the real value of exports in manufacturing industry sectors with export cartel 
exemptions is higher than in comparable manufacturing industry sectors without an 
exemption.  But this result is driven exclusively by the selection process among industries 
which elect to obtain ETC exemptions.  Analysis of the impact of receiving an ETC 
exemption on exports, controlling for the growth rate of exports in the industry, shows that on 
average ETCs do not increase exports.  In some estimates, the real value of exports actually 
falls after receiving an ETC.  There are two possible explanations for this.  One is that firms 
choose to obtain an ETC exemption when they are concerned that exports in the sector are 
going to fall.  Receiving an ETC thus precedes this fall in exports, but does not cause it.  The 
second possible explanation is that industries with ETCs can in fact exercise market power 
and the decline in the real value of exports reflects a strategic reduction in the quantity of 
goods exported.  Given the predominance of ETCs in relatively unconcentrated industries we 
believe the former explanation is more plausible. 
II. Global Trends in Export Exemptions 
Of the fifty-five countries for which we have obtained information, seventeen provide 
explicit exemptions similar to those provided by the U.S. ETC Act (Levenstein and Suslow 
2005, p. 800).  Six of these countries require prior review (Australia, Israel, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Taiwan, and the U.S.), while others simply require notification and will review 
the nature of the cooperative export activities only if a question is raised about possible anti-
competitive effects.  As in the U.S., where trade associations can apply for an ETC, 
exemptions are sometimes provided to associations or groups of firms.  In some countries, 
such as Australia and Israel, exemptions are provided for specific transactions, rather than the 
blanket exemptions granted for an indefinite period of time to U.S. ETCs. 
Thirty-five countries have no explicit exemptions (e.g., Argentina, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain), but instead restrict their competition legislation to the domestic market, 
with no mention of behavior affecting foreign markets.11  In doing so, these countries limit the 
scope of their antitrust law, and grant export exemptions by negative implication.  The 
                                                 
11 Levenstein and Suslow (2005), p. 805 (stated as “Most countries in our sample (64%), including almost all 
members of the EU, have implicit exemptions). 
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European Union is an example of this form of implicit exemption:  firm behavior that lessens 
competition in foreign markets is simply not mentioned in the competition laws, while 
domestic price-fixing is explicitly prohibited.   
In nine of the thirty-five countries that restrict their laws to the domestic market, this 
implicit exemption is a recent phenomenon.  For example, Germany, Japan, and South Korea 
all had explicit exemptions until the late 1990s.12  One drawback to this trend toward implicit 
exemption is that there is no reporting requirement covering cooperative activity for export, 
and therefore no oversight or information about the extent of any such activity. 
Given this global patchwork of explicit and implicit exemptions, with some countries 
requiring notification and others not, it is impossible to determine how prevalent joint export 
activity is today.  Historically, when explicit exemptions requiring notification were more 
common, the numbers were relatively high.  For example, in 1972, Germany issued 227 
export association exemptions and Japan issued 175.13  These years were typical until the 
mid- to late-1990s, when Germany and Japan began to work toward changing their laws; by 
2000 both countries had eliminated such exemptions.  In the U.S., however, we have had a 
consistent export exemption (or immunity) provision since 1982.  We turn now to an 
overview of how the Export Trade Certificate of Review program functions. 
III. The U.S. Export Trading Company Act of 1982 
A. Implementation of ETC Act 
Firms interested in obtaining an antitrust exemption for cooperative export activities from 
the United States must apply to the U.S. Department of Commerce for exemption under the 
ETC Act. 14  In addition to the public notification in the Federal Register, the application is 
reviewed by the Department of Justice to ensure that there will be no anti-competitive 
                                                 
12 Levenstein and Suslow (2005), pp. 806-811. 
13 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005), Table 1. 
14 Almost all ETCs apply to and receive their certification from the Department of Commerce.  As discussed 
further below, a very small number of ETCs have been formed by financial institutions who have received 
certification from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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spillover to the domestic market.15  If approved, an “Export Trade Certificate of Review” is 
issued.  The firm or of group of firms receiving a Certificate is known as an ETC.  This pre-
certification review differs from the procedure for WP Associations, which simply registered 
themselves.16  In return for this additional scrutiny, an ETC Act exemption provides enhanced 
protection beyond that offered by the WP Act, including the following:17  (1) it shifts the 
burden of proof for a domestic antitrust claim to the complaining party; (2) it limits any civil 
damages awarded to single rather than the triple damages allowed by U.S. law; (3) it allows 
financial institutions to participate as members of an ETC; (4) it allows exporters of services 
as well as goods to receive exemptions; (5) it allows a single individual or firm to receive an 
exemption, rather than restricting it to associations of firms; (6) it allows ETCs to be engaged 
in domestic and foreign economic activity, rather than restricted exclusively to export trade; 
and (6) it is enforced and promoted by the Department of Commerce, rather than the Federal 
Trade Commission.  In comparison to the implicit exemptions favored by numerous countries, 
as discussed above, the ETC Act provides stronger protection should the firms’ joint export 
actions adversely affect competition in the domestic market.   
An ETC exemption is granted for an indefinite period of time, provided that the ETC files 
an annual report with the Department of Commerce.  From 1983 to 2004, 195 ETCs were 
granted.  Figure 1 shows that a large number of ETCs were granted immediately after the 
passage of the ETC Act, followed by a tapering off of applications.  Forty-two ETCs have 
been revoked over the years for failure to file an annual report and seventy-eight have been 
voluntarily relinquished, leaving seventy-eight ETCs still in existence in 2006.18  Although 
                                                 
15 “The Secretary of Commerce may not issue a certificate until the Attorney General agrees that [certain] 
standards are met.  The Secretary must publish notice of the application in the Federal Register and must act 
within ninety days of receiving the application.” Waller (1997), p. 9-46.  These standards cover whether there 
might be a restraint of trade within the U.S. and/or whether granting the export trade certificate might “constitute 
unfair methods of competition” against competitors who are not part of the ETC but also export from the United 
States. 
16 Nye (1993), p. 310. 
17 See Lacy (1987), p. 177-186, for a more comprehensive summary of the differences between the WP Act and 
the ETC Act. 
18 Note that thirty-seven ETCs have been revoked from 1983 to 2004, which is our sample period, but an 
additional five were revoked in 2006.  The figure of 78 ETCs still in existence comes from an e-mail 
correspondence with Jeffrey Anspacher, Director, Export Trading Company Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, May 26, 2006. 
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the authority exists to revoke an ETC for violation of its terms (other than not filing an annual 
report), this has never occurred.   
The ETC Certificate delimits the scope of the exemption provided to the ETC and its 
members.  The Certificate specifies the geographic region where joint export activity is 
permitted, the products covered by the Certificate, and the nature of activities in which the 
ETC is permitted to engage.  In some cases, these specifications are very general and 
permissive (e.g. “all parts of the world, except the United States” and “all products”), but in 
other cases they are very specific (e.g., exports are limited to “Japan” or “fresh cultivated 
blueberries”).  An example illustrates the general nature of ETCs and the kinds of activities in 
which they are given permission to engage.  The ETC granted to the U.S. Textile Export 
Company (TEXPORT) in August 1995 had the following features (among others): 
• 13 members 
• Products:  “Broadwoven fabric, cotton (SIC 2211); Broadwoven fabric, man-made 
fiber (SIC 2221); Broadwoven fabric, wool (SIC 2231); Narrow woven fabric and 
other small wares (SIC 2258); Finishers of broadwoven fabric of cotton (SIC 
2261); Finishers of broadwoven fabrics of man-made fiber (SIC 2262); Nonwoven 
fabrics (SIC 2297).” 
• Export market:  “The export markets include all parts of the world except the 
United States (the fifty states of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands.).” 
• Export Trade Activities and Methods of Operation:  “Solicit orders from foreign 
customers”; “Arrange for transportation of merchandise sold from Members’ plants 
and warehouses, etc. to customers’ premises”; arrange for financing and customs 
clearance; conduct market research; quote prices to potential customers from 
Members’ price lists. 
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• Allowed information exchange including the following, among other provisions:  
Members may exchange and discuss information “that is already generally 
available to the trade or public”; “Information about sales or marketing efforts in 
Export Markets, pricing in Export Markets; projected demand in Export Markets”; 
“Information about export prices, quality, quantity; source, and delivery dates of 
Products available from Members for export”; “Information about joint bidding, 
selling, or servicing arrangements in Export Markets and allocation of sales 
resulting therefrom among the Members.” 
• Terms and Conditions of Certificate include the following, among other 
provisions: neither TEXPORT nor any Member shall disclose any information 
“that is about its or any other Member’s costs, production, capacity, inventories, 
domestic prices, domestic sales, domestic orders, terms of domestic marketing or 
sale, or U.S. business plans, strategies, or methods, unless (i) such information is 
already generally available to the trade or public; or (ii) the information disclosed is 
a necessary term or condition (e.g., price, time required to fill an order, etc.) of an 
actual or potential bona fide sale and the disclosure is limited to the prospective 
purchasing Member.” 
This example illustrates many of the “boilerplate” specifications that appear in almost all 
Certificates, but there is quite a bit of variety across Certificates as well.  For example, most, 
but not all, Certificates list individual members and individual products.  Most Certificates 
allow members to fix prices, but some do not.  Most ETCs are allowed to coordinate their 
export activities in all parts of the world except the U.S., but others specifically exclude 
Canada and Mexico or specifically include the Middle East and Africa.  We will discuss more 
detailed features of the ETCs below. 
B. Antitrust Challenges to ETCs 
Only one ETC has been challenged in U.S. courts, but the challenge failed on appeal in 
1987.19  Internationally, there have been several challenges to Webb-Pomerene associations, 
                                                 
19 The Chlor/Alkali Producers International ETC was granted in January 1985 and challenged by Horizons 
International in 1986.  Four chemical companies formed the ETC:  B.F. Goodrich Company, Kaiser Aluminum 
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but none (to our knowledge) to ETCs.20  The most famous Webb-Pomerene challenge by a 
foreign authority was the 1988 Wood Pulp decision by the European Court of Justice.21  The 
members of the Wood Pulp WP Association argued that the European Union had no 
jurisdiction and that the antitrust exemption granted them by the United States implied that 
their activities were also legal under EU law.  Both of these arguments were rejected.22  The 
American Natural Soda Ash Corporation (“ANSAC”), a WP association formed in 1983, has 
also fought legal battles with antitrust authorities in the European Union, India, South Africa, 
and Venezuela.23  ANSAC’s reformulation as the American-European Soda Ash Shipping 
Association (“AESASA”) satisfied the European Commission’s exemption requirements, but 
ANSAC has generally been unsuccessful in convincing any competition authority that the 
efficiency benefits of the association outweigh the potential for exercising market power.   
More recently, there has been a broad investigation by the Irish Competition Authority of 
the few lingering WP associations.24  When the investigation began in 2003, there were 
eleven WP associations, but now only seven remain.  Several of the associations singled out 
for special concern by the Irish authority have disbanded in the intervening years “or have 
given commitments to the EU or the Irish authorities that they are not involved in cartel 
activities in the relevant area.”25  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Chemical, Occidental Chemical Corporation, and Vulcan Materials Company.  Their ETC covered the 
export of caustic soda and chlorine.  The certificate also stated that this ETC may “refuse to quote prices for, or 
to market or sell, caustic soda and chlorine to its or its members' competitors in the Export Markets.”  Horizons, 
a broker of caustic soda on international markets, sued the Departments of Commerce and Justice in 1986.  It 
won initially, but then lost on appeal.  (See Lacy 1987, p. 193) 
20 This is confirmed in testimony by John J. Sullivan, U.S. Department of Commerce, before the Antitrust 
Modernization Committee in public hearings on “Statutory Immunities and Exemptions” held on December 1, 
2005.  He states that “there has never been a successful antitrust challenge to export conduct covered by a 
Certificate of Review either in the United States or, to the best of our knowledge, anywhere else in the world.” 
(p. 8).  The transcript of this hearing is available at:  http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings.htm. 
21 See Åhlströhm v. Commission, 1988 European Court Reports 5193.  Domestically, there have been 
occasional challenges and investigations of Webb-Pomerene associations, some by the Federal Trade 
Commission and some by the Department of Justice, primarily in the 1940s and 1950s.  See Waller (1997), pp. 
9-31 to 9-33. 
22 For a brief summary of the case and the issues involved, see Sugden (2002), pp. 22-23. 
23 See Bhattacharjea (2004), pp. 340-47. 
24 Keena (2005). 




IV. Previous Research on the Economic Impact of U.S. Export Exemptions 
Most prior research on the impact of the antitrust exemptions offered to exporters by the 
U.S. government, including analyses of both the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Export Trading 
Company Act, has concluded that these exemptions had little impact on either competition or 
trade.  Only a small number of exemptions have been issued, and, it is often argued, they have 
done little either to promote exports or impede competition in international markets.  Several 
government reviews over the course of the twentieth century questioned the effectiveness of 
the WP Act.26  The first comprehensive review was undertaken in 1929, concluding, “While 
extravagant expectations of some erstwhile proponents have not been realized, the harmful 
consequences feared by its opponents have also failed to come true.”27  Later reports were 
significantly harsher in tone, but they had similar qualitative conclusions, as reported in a 
1967 study by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC):28 
The full expectations of the Webb Act’s proponents have not been realized 
over the half century since its passage.  The hope that with antitrust exemption 
hundreds of associations would be formed to serve as joint selling agents for 
small firm exports remains but a vision.  During the period 1918-65, a total of 
176 associations were properly registered with the Federal Trade 
Commission; of these, only 130 ever functioned in a way to assist U.S. 
exports… 
The FTC found that approximately one-third of all registered associations functioned for 
five years or less, and that WP-assisted exports were at most 2.4 percent of total U.S. 
exports.29  The difficulty in measuring whether an export association actually functions “to 
assist U.S. exports” is of great significance, both for assessing the effects on the WP Act and 
the ETC Act.  A 1978 FTC study focused on this problem, stating at the outset of their report 
that “[i]nadequate data has shown up as a glaring deficiency of most assessments of the 
Webb-Pomerene Act.”30  The authors of the 1978 FTC study used a survey designed to 
                                                 
26 Federal Trade Commission (1967, 1978).  Earlier government reviews were done in 1929 and 1946, and 
independent reviews were conducted as well (see Federal Trade Commission, 1967, pp. 8, 11-12 for references). 
27 Federal Trade Commission (1967), p. 8. 
28 Federal Trade Commission (1967), p. 23 
29 Federal Trade Commission (1967), pp. 24, 36. 
30 Federal Trade Commission (1978), p. 2. 
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carefully account for exports that were directly assisted by Webb-Pomerene exemptions from 
antitrust laws.  Their goal was to distinguish these exports from those where an association of 
firms was not required (that is, exports made by an individual firm, acting independently, 
even though that firm happened to be a part of a WP association).  The FTC found that 
“assisted exports” were only 1.5 percent of total U.S. exports in 1976.31  With such a limited 
embrace by businesses, it is difficult to imagine that the benefits of the WP Act outweighed 
the administrative costs and the potential risk of anti-competitive spillovers to the domestic 
economy. 
Empirical research by Andrew Dick (1992, 1996) provides the only rigorous statistical 
analysis of the impact of WP associations.  Between 1920 and 1965, Webb-Pomerene price-
fixing agreements appear to be “more common where the industry had a large export market 
share, buyers were un-concentrated, and entry was slow.”32  Overall, his judgment is that the 
primary purpose of WP Associations was to facilitate the marketing of exports, with only a 
small minority exercising market power.  Half of the associations had no significant impact on 
the quantity or price of exports.33 
Economic analysis of the ETC Act – as opposed to legal research and commentary – is 
sparse.  This is partly for the same reason that there is limited research on the WP Act:  
inadequate data.  Although ETCs must file annual reports with the Department of Commerce 
in order to maintain their exemption, these reports are confidential and exempt from the 
Freedom of Information Act.  Two early articles on the ETC Act’s effectiveness came from 
insiders:  James Lacy, former director of Office of Export Trading Company Affairs, and 
William Nye, an economist at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.  Lacy 
(1987) estimated that, as of the end of 1986, total export sales by fifty-four active ETCs were 
$305.5 million.34  He claims that the ETC Act had succeeded in increasing exports, but he 
acknowledges the difficulty in estimating the value of exports truly facilitated by the ETC 
Act. 
                                                 
31 Federal Trade Commission (1978), p. 15. 
32 Dick (1996), p. 214 
33 Dick (1992), p. 93. 
34 Lacy (1987), p. 181. 
 
 13
Nye (1993) uses a 1983-87 sample covering sixty-three ETCs.  He reports that in 1986, 
ETC exports were $265 million, or “one-tenth of one percent of U.S. merchandise exports in 
1986.”35  Nye, who was able to survey the confidential annual report data filed by ETCs, 
draws several interesting conclusions.  First, he finds that 14 of the 63 ETCs in his sample 
were certified to set price abroad.36  Of these 14 ETCs, there were 9 that had more than one 
member firm, and thus may have “had some intent of exercising market power overseas.”37  
Also, he finds that in at least one-third of his sample ETC member firms exported 
independently of the ETC.38  He speculates that economies of scale in exporting can not 
therefore be the most important motive for ETC formation.  He concludes that protection from 
vertical antitrust suits appears to be the primary motivation39.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that Nye finds a skewed distribution in ETC exports.  Drawing on the confidential 
annual reports of individual ETCs, he determines that seventeen of the “active” ETCs 
reported no exports at all.  More notably, the largest four ETCs accounted for 78 percent of all 
ETC exports and the largest nine ETCs accounted for 93 percent of all ETC exports.40   
Several years further into the implementation of the ETC Act, Spencer Weber Waller 
(1992, 1997) analyzed the limited publicly available data on ETCs and came to a very 
different conclusion from that reached by Nye and Lacy.  He characterizes the response of the 
business community to the ETC program as “mediocre,” arguing that the following factors all 
contributed to a lack of interest in the exemption offered by the ETC Act:  the dramatic 
appreciation of the dollar in the 1980s, the fear of disclosing confidential business information 
in the certification process, and the lack of precedent in interpreting the promised antitrust 
immunity.41  Although Congress anticipated that over 20,000 firms would take advantage of 
the ETC exemption, Waller cites data indicating that until trade associations were recruited by 
the Department of Commerce to form ETCs, the number of participating firms was very 
small.  In 1987 only 307 firms were members of an ETC; in the early 1990s, that number 
                                                 
35 Nye (1993), p. 311. 
36 Nye (1993), p. 314. 
37 Nye (1993), p. 314. 
38 Nye (1993), p. 315 
39 Nye (1993), pp. 316-317. 
40 Nye (1993), p. 311. Jeffrey Anspacher, Director, Export Trading Company Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, states that this is still approximately true today, although the percentage of exports accounted for by 
the top four ETCs is not quite as large as it was in the late 1980s.  (Phone conversation, June 5, 2006.) 
41 Waller (1992), pp. 246-47. 
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grew to 4,200 with the addition of numerous trade associations.42  By 2006, the number of 
companies participating in the 78 extant ETCs had fallen to 3000.43 
Waller’s conclusions about the impact of the ETC Act parallel those of Dick (1996). 
Waller is not concerned that the ETC program creates market power or barriers to entry.  The 
ETC Act “[permits] an industry, as a matter of U.S. law, to collusively exploit such market 
power abroad if it already exists.  The history of the Webb-Pomerene Act suggests that few 
export associations will have sufficient global market power to exploit foreign markets.”44  
However, his analysis suggests that the majority of ETCs are not horizontal associations; they 
are either vertical associations or simply downstream distributors.45 Thus he concludes that 
the impact of the ETC Act is negligible, both in encouraging exports and in facilitating the 
exercise of market power. 
V. ETC Sample and Characteristics 
A. The Sample 
We have assembled a data set of 195 ETCs – all those created from when the first 
certificate was granted in 1983 through the end of 2004.  The data draw on information 
published in the Federal Register when the ETC is issued.  The mean number of members in 
an ETC is seventeen, but the median is only five.46  The large difference in the mean and 
median arises because of three ETCs that had between 120 and 320 members.  The modal 
number of members is one:  roughly 20 percent of ETCs have only one member.  This 
comports with Waller’s evaluation of ETCs, which concluded that “the majority of the ETCs 
have been export intermediaries, export facilitators, or export service providers that do not 
even function as horizontal agreements between competitors, let alone function as export 
cartels.  These types of ETCs typically seek certification to enter exclusive or nonexclusive 
                                                 
42 See Waller (1992), p. 247 for the “20,000 firms” forecast from Congress and the “4,200” figure for the number 
of ETC members.  See Waller (1997), pp. 9-54 and 9-55 for the discussion of trade associations and the “307 
firms” figure. 
43 Testimony by John J. Sullivan, U.S. Department of Commerce, before the Antitrust Modernization Committee 
in public hearings on “Statutory Immunities and Exemptions” held on December 1, 2005, p. 10.  
44 Waller (1992), p. 251. 
45 Id., pp. 251-252. 
46 This estimate is based on only half the ETCs: 93 ETC certificates do not state the number of members in the 
association.  We also exclude the National Tooling & Machining Association ETC from our calculation of the 
mean.  It is an extreme outlier with thousands of members. 
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vertical arrangements to represent or sell one or more of its customers’ products in export 
markets.”47 
ETCs are typically granted for the export of specific products.  We would like to know the 
quantity of these goods exported by ETCs, and ideally we would like to compare the amounts 
exported to what the member firms would have exported absent the ETC exemption.  Because 
we do not have access to the confidential export information reported by the ETCs – let alone 
to counterfactual information regarding their exports without the ETC – we instead examine 
changes in the actual value of exports from the United States in the product categories in 
which ETCs are permitted to export.  Specifically, we collect data on exports organized into 
6-digit NAICS categories (the North American Industrial Classification System).  As an 
example of the level of disaggregation of a 6-digit NAICS product category, consider the ETC 
granted in 1983 to International Trailer Sales, Inc.  The products covered in this ETC are 
“commercial trailers for construction, heavy equipment and other hauling, truck tractors, and 
parts and supplies therefor.”  The 2-digit NAICS category that these products fall in would be 
“Manufacturing”; the three digit category is “Machinery Manufacturing”; the four-digit 
category is “Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing”; and the 6-
digit category that we assign is 333120, which is “Construction Machinery Manufacturing.”  
Of the 195 ETCs granted from 1983-2004, we were able to link 106 ETCs to specific 
manufacturing NAICS categories.  There are several reasons for the drop in sample size.  
Some export certificates do not restrict the products that the ETC can export:  for example, 
NYVZ Import and Export, Inc. is permitted to export “all products” and Hammerl-Davis 
International, Inc. has permission to export “all industrial and consumer products.”  Other 
ETCs are “restricted” to such a vast array of products that it is meaningless to code them.  For 
example, the International Development Institute may export “Goods . . . In the areas of: (a) 
Agriculture; (b) Agribusiness; (c) Construction and mining; (d) Consumer products; (e) 
Education; (f) Energy; (g) Fiber processing; (h) Fishing; (i) Food processing; (j) Food storage 
and handling; (k) Forestry and lumber; (l) Office furniture, equipment, and supplies; (m) 
Health and medicine; (n) Household durables; (o) Housing; (p) Sanitation; and (q) 
Transportation.”  In some cases, ETCs have permission to export services for which we do not 
                                                 
47 Waller (1992), pp. 251-52. 
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have export data (e.g., Intex’s certificate covers “consulting engineering service” and Marine 
Midland Trade’s certificate covers “all services”).  We also eliminate from our sample ETCs 
that exclusively export agricultural products because it was not possible to obtain many of the 
other relevant variables necessary for analysis.  In particular, we do not have industry-specific 
exchange rates for agriculture, nor do we have a measure of market concentration consistent 
with the manufacturing data.   
Many ETCs have permission to export products that fall into multiple NAICS codes; that 
is, they export more than one type of product.  Conversely, several NAICS categories have 
more than one ETC operating in them.  Table 1 shows the sectoral distribution of all 195 
ETCs:  a quarter of ETCs export agricultural products and almost 90% export manufacturing 
goods.  A very small number are engaged in publishing, mining, and construction.  A more 
detailed breakdown is given in Table 2, showing the distribution of ETCs among 
manufacturing NAICS categories.  There are 106 ETCs for which we were able to identify 
specific products, exporting in 90 different NAICS categories. One quarter of all 6-digit 
NAICS manufacturing categories included an ETC in at least one year.  The industries in 
which ETCs most frequently appear are tobacco, lumber, electronic equipment, food, 
chemicals, and textiles. 
Despite the innovation in the ETC Act expanding the WP Act exemption to cover services 
and finance, there are very few such ETCs.  Bank-owned ETCs are permitted under the ETC 
Act, governed by special rules, and bank holding companies can apply to their Federal 
Reserve Bank for an ETC.48  ETCs issued by the Federal Reserve are not published in the 
Federal Register (the source of our data), and therefore we do not include them in our sample.  
In Nye’s survey of 78 applications for an ETC before May 1987, he found that “a number of” 
bank ETCs had registered with the Federal Reserve, but “only one has thus far sought the 
antitrust protection of an Export Certificate of Review.”49  A 1993 event study, examining the 
initial wealth effects of bank ETC formations, compiled a sample of only fifteen banks that 
                                                 
48 “Title II of the 1982 Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act of 1950 to permit bank holding companies, 
bankers' banks and Edge Act corporations to participate in organizing ETCs and to acquire shares of an ETC...” 
(Nye 1993, p. 321).  
49 Nye (1993), p. 310. 
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announced their intentions to form ETCs for the years 1982-1991.50  The situation has not 
changed substantially in the intervening years.  As of April 2005, there were at most three 
bank-owned ETCs in the country.51 
B. Selected ETC Characteristics 
1. Price Fixing 
Of central interest to evaluating the impact of ETCs are the dual issues of whether ETCs 
are legally permitted to fix prices, and whether ETCs have the necessary market power to take 
advantage of this exemption in a manner that harms consumers.  The latter question is 
incorporated into our empirical analysis below.  Here we examine more closely what “fixing 
prices” means in the context of an Export Trade Certificate of Review. 
The vast majority of all Certificates – 141 out of 195 – explicitly allow the ETC members 
to fix prices.  Among ETCs included in our regression sample, 80 out of 106 are granted the 
right to set prices.  Certificates are extraordinarily detailed in specifying the conditions under 
which firms in an export association may fix prices.  We treat all of the following language as 
providing the ETC with explicit permission to fix prices: 
• “may negotiate and agree on the terms … including … the price to be bid” 
• “may enter into agreements… that contain price… restrictions” 
• permitted to “discuss method for setting export prices” 
In some cases the permission to set prices is qualified.  For example, one certificate 
provides that the ETC may “[e]stablish export prices …with each Member being free to 
deviate from such prices by whatever amount it sees fit” (emphasis added).52  Waller (1992) 
analyzes the type of price-fixing each ETC is permitted.  He finds that slightly more than half 
                                                 
50 Kryzanowski and Ursel (1993, p. 379) find that “[a]nnouncements of ETC formations by U.S. banks caused 
significant (negative) stock price reaction with no evidence of risk increases.  These results suggest that the 
market believed that involvement of U.S. banks in ETCs would not be value-enhancing.” 
51 Phone communication with Bank Applications at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, April 2005.  Federal 
Reserve data indicate that there are currently two reporting organizations that are ETCs.  However, there is a 
third organization, still in existence, which was previously considered an ETC, but apparently no longer operates 
as one. 
52 ETC granted to “Construction Industry Manufacturers Association,” announced in the Federal Register on 
June 12, 1989. 
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of the ETCs through 1990 sought certification for “the full range of price setting, production 
restriction, and policing powers normally associated with cartel behavior” (p. 252).  We count 
all of the categories listed above (including the ETCs that are “free to deviate” from ETC-set 
prices) as a form of price fixing.  Using these criteria, a little over a quarter of all ETCs do not 
have permission to fix prices.  In some cases, the Certificate makes no mention of price 
fixing.  In others, the language is sufficiently restrictive that we deem it not to provide 
permission to fix prices.  Examples of this more restrictive language include:  
•  “may...[c]ontact individual suppliers to elicit information relating to sales of 
products and services in the Export Markets, including price, volume, and estimated 
delivery schedules.”53 
• “Provide to suppliers on an individual basis information on specific solicitation 
(including price…)”54 
• “Invite suppliers to provide independent price quotations”55 
• “collect information on the Export Markets to assist Members in determining 
the market price”56 
In almost all cases, explicit permission to fix price is accompanied by an explicit 
restriction on sharing of information on costs or other restrictions that are designed to limit 
anti-competitive spillovers in the domestic market. 
2. Prior experience with Webb-Pomerene Associations 
It is possible that an ETC might be more successful if some or all of its member firms had 
prior experience participating in Webb-Pomerene Associations.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, we have matched the member firms in WP associations from the 1930s to 2004 
with the names of ETC member firms.  There is a very small overlap:  only 12 of the 195 
ETCs over the sample period previously participated in 10 WP associations, and only 8 of the 
106 ETCs in the regression sample were previously members of 7 WP associations.  In one 
                                                 
53 ETC granted to “Michael Mace d/b/a Mutual Trade Services,” announced in the Federal Register on April 6, 
1988. 
54 ETC granted to “Global Marketing Associates, Inc.,” announced in the Federal Register on August 29, 1988. 
55 ETC granted to “Sun International Trading, Ltd.,” announced in the Federal Register on June 7, 1989. 
56 ETC granted to “Northwest Blueberries USA, Inc.,” announced in the Federal Register on Nov. 9, 1993. 
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such case, the Corn Refiners Association was granted an ETC in December 2002, with 
members including such firms as A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company, Archer Daniels 
Midland Company, Cargill, Inc., Corn Products International, Inc., and National Starch and 
Chemical Company.  ADM and A.E. Staley were members of a WP association registered in 
1958, known as the “Vegetable Oil Export Corporation”; Cargill was a member of the WP 
“Tri-State Export Corporation” registered in 1960 and continuing into the early 1990s. We 
discuss the relationship between prior experience with Webb-Pomerene Associations and the 
ability to exercise market power (or not) in our results section below, but this example does 
highlight the fact that ETC exemptions are not used exclusively by small firms needing to 
cooperate to overcome the hurdles of participating in international markets. 
VI. Economic Impact of the ETC Act 
A. Empirical Specification 
We expect a country’s exports to be a function of global economic activity and relative 
prices (reflected in exchange rates).57  We estimate the determinants of the real value of U.S. 
manufacturing exports, disaggregated to the 6-digit NAICS level, from 1978 to 2004.  We 
begin the sample in 1978 in order to control for trends in exports prior to the passage of the 
ETC Act and the granting of the first ETC exemptions.  
We include in these estimates a dummy variable indicating whether an ETC had 
permission to export in the 6-digit NAICS product group.  If an ETC allows firms to 
overcome fixed costs associated with exporting, permitting joint activity among firms in the 
sector should increase exports, all else equal.  If, on the other hand, ETCs facilitate the 
exercise of market power in foreign markets, receiving an ETC has an ambiguous impact on 
the value of total exports.  In this case we would expect the quantity of exports to fall and the 
price to rise.  To the extent that our measure of the real value of exports controls for changes 
in price – because the nominal value of exports has been adjusted by an overall export price 
index – we would expect the total value of exports to fall in industries where the ETC can 
                                                 
57 For a survey of the theory of foreign trade, as well as an extensive survey of the empirical work and 
econometric issues, see Goldstein and Khan (1985) and Bayoumi (1999).   
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exercise monopoly power.58  However, our price index is much more aggregate than are the 
products affected by ETCs; any increases in prices of specific ETC products are likely to be 
masked by the large number of other products in the price index.  Thus, the effect on the total 
value of exports depends on the elasticity of demand.  If ETCs operate in industries with 
elastic demand, or are effective enough to raise price to the elastic region of demand, then we 
would expect to see declines in total revenue.  If ETCs operate in industries with inelastic 
demand or are unable to raise the price to close to the monopoly level, then the total value of 
ETC exports would increase even though the quantity of exports had fallen. 
We follow the standard trade literature in our specification of the demand for U.S. exports 
(Krugman and Baldwin 1987, Sawyer and Sprinkle 1996, Bahmani-Oskooee and Ardalani 
2006).  We posit an export demand function in which the value of real exports in each NAICS 
product group in each year is a function of non-US GDP and an industry-specific exchange 
rate index.  A measure of industry concentration is included to capture differences in the 
degree of price setting ability by the firms granted an ETC.  While ideally we would like to 
include global industry concentration, data limitations force us to use as a proxy concentration 
in the U.S. market as measured by the industry (6-digit NAICS) Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
of industry concentration (HHI).  In order to capture the impact of the ETC exemption and the 
potential variation in the impact of this exemption in different industries, we include two 
additional variables: a dummy variable indicating whether an ETC Certificate has been 
granted for the industry, and an interaction term between this dummy variable and the HHI.   
The Federal Register reports the years in which each ETC is granted, and, if applicable, 
the year in which it is revoked.  The average duration of revoked ETCs is seven years.  The 
Federal Register does not report when or if a given ETC is voluntarily relinquished.  Using 
information provided by the Department of Commerce we have calculated that 42% of ETCs 
have been relinquished.  The average duration of voluntarily relinquished ETCs is eight years.  
In our empirical specification below we consider a NAICS to have an “active” ETC in the 
first seven years after an ETC Certificate was issued.  Because we expect an ETC to have its 
greatest impact in the first few years after the ETC has been issued, in some specifications we 
                                                 
58 See Data Appendix for description of export data and the export price index used to deflate the export data. 
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allow the impact of the ETC to diminish over time.  In other specifications, we examine 
differences in differences, using industry fixed effects to control for industry-specific trends in 
exports that are distinguishable from the specific impact of receiving an ETC exemption.   
We begin by estimating the following equation for the determination of export growth: 
Ln Exports = β1 + β2Ln(Non-US GDP) + β3 Ln(Exchange Rate) + β4ETC + β5HHI  
                             + β6ETC*HHI + β7Industry 
where59: 
• Exports:  Real value of exports in millions of 2000 U.S. dollars  
• Non-US GDP:  Global GDP, excluding the United States, in billions of 2000 
U.S. dollars  
• ETC:  Dummy variable indicating whether an ETC was granted in a given 
industry (defined using 6-digit NAICS codes) at some point in the last seven years.   
• HHI:  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration, by NAICS 
codes; 1987 value for pre-1992 observations and 1997 value for later observations 
• Exchange Rate:  Industry specific exchange rate index (industries defined at 
the 3-digit NAICS)60 
• Industry:  3-digit NAICS industry dummies 
We estimate this equation using both OLS and a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of all 
U.S. manufacturing exports from 1978 to 2004.  Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. 
We use a NAICS-level fixed-effects estimator to control for unexplained cross-sectional 
variation in export trends. There are 325 unique NAICS included in the regression sample.  
Aggregating across years, 235 of the 325 unique NAICS never contain an ETC.   
                                                 
59 See Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
60 The exchange rate index, including the most up-to-date revisions, was generously provided by Linda Goldberg 




B. Empirical Results 
Our estimates of the demand for U.S. exports are generally similar to those of previous 
estimates. We find that increases in foreign GDP significantly increase demand for U.S. 
exports.  We estimate the elasticity of demand for exports as a function of non-US GDP as 
2.03, somewhat smaller than found by Krugman and Baldwin (1987) and Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Ardalani (2006), and somewhat larger than  Bahmani-Oskooee (1991).   Our estimates of 
the sensitivity of U.S. manufacturing exports to changes in the value of the dollar are also 
comparable to those in the literature.  We find that exports are essentially unit elastic with 
respect to fluctuations in our exchange rate index.    
Our OLS estimates suggest that the receipt of an ETC exemption significantly increases 
industry exports (Table 4).  The coefficient of 0.69 on our ETC dummy implies a doubling of 
exports associated with having an ETC exemption.  The 95% confidence interval suggests 
that industry exports are between 63 and 144 percent higher in each of the seven years after 
receiving an ETC exemption than in other industries and years.  Concentration itself has a 
positive but negligible effect on exports.  The benefit gained from an ETC exemption seems 
to be the same regardless of industry concentration as implied by the insignificant coefficient 
on the ETC-HHI interaction variable. 
These results are reversed in the fixed effects (FE) estimates, reported in Table 5.  This 
approach controls for idiosyncratic trends in export growth at the level of individual 6-digit 
NAICS.  Once we have controlled for trend growth at this more disaggregated level, the ETC 
dummy variable has a statistically significant negative impact on exports.  The -0.10 
coefficient implies a reduction of exports by 10%.  The GDP and exchange rate coefficients 
are unchanged in the FE estimates. HHI switches sign, suggesting that exports fall as 
concentration increases, but the size is still extremely small. The interaction term, estimating 
the differential impact of ETCs in industries of different concentration, is still insignificant. 
There are several possible explanations of this result.  First, exports may be growing more 
quickly in industries with ETCs for reasons entirely unrelated to having an ETC.  We 
speculated that export growth might actually lead an industry to choose to get an ETC, but 
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this does not appear to be the case.  Regression estimates attempting to predict which 
industries would obtain ETCs as a function of prior export growth displayed entirely 
insignificant results.  This also indicates that the ETC exemption is not being used 
disproportionately by those industries that the U.S. Congress had in mind in adopting the ETC 
legislation, namely those in which exports were declining as a result of increased competition 
from cooperating foreign firms.  It is likely, however, that the positive association found in 
the OLS results does reflect the choice by industry participants to get an ETC: it is industries 
with firms that want to increase exports that get an ETC. 
Second, as is clear from this discussion, receipt of an ETC exemption is not exogenous, 
but is a decision of members of the industry.  We were unable to control for this endogeneity 
using standard methods because there is no obvious instrument for ETCs.  However, it is not 
clear how this endogeneity biases our results or might explain the difference in the results of 
OLS and FE estimation, if in fact export growth is not the driving factor in ETC selection. 
One possibility is that firms get an ETC because they are concerned that exports will fall, or 
not grow as fast, in the future, but that the receipt of the ETC exemption does not stem the 
decline. 
Third, it is possible that the receipt of an ETC exemption allows member firms to exert 
market power and strategically decrease exports.  We think this is unlikely because most 
ETCs are in industries that are not concentrated even within the United States.  Figure 3 
shows the distribution of ETCs by HHI.  The vast majority are in industries with an HHI 
below 1800, the U.S. Justice Department’s cutoff for concern regarding market power.61  This 
point is even more emphatic once we control for differences in exports across industries.  
Figure 4 confirms that industry exports from NAICS with ETCs are predominantly in 
unconcentrated industries.  If ETCs were exercising market power to reduce exports, we 
would expect to see exports decline most in those markets that are most likely to have market 
power, namely those that are highly concentrated.  The ETC-HHI interaction term, however, 
is statistically insignificant in every specification.   
                                                 
61 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992), with 
1997 revisions, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. 
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We examine the “market power” hypothesis more carefully with the inclusion of a dummy 
variable indicating whether the ETC was given the authority to fix prices.  In the OLS 
regression (Table 6, column 1), this variable, which is highly collinear with simply having an 
ETC, is negative but statistically insignificant.  In the FE specification (Table 6, column 2), 
the significance of having an ETC disappears; the “price fixing dummy” is picking up all of 
the negative effect previously picked up by the ETC dummy.  Thus it appears that any 
negative effect on exports is restricted to those with the authority to fix prices. 
In some specifications, we also include a variable controlling for prior Webb Pomerene 
experience.  In the OLS estimates, this variable was not significant.  In the FE estimates, 
however, the WP variable was associated with higher exports.  It is surprising to find any 
statistically significant effect, given the small number of ETCs with prior WP experience.  We 
suspect that the association with higher exports reflects the longer history of engaging in 
export activities in these industries.   
Export data disaggregated to the level we use in this study may be plagued by 
measurement problems.  To make sure that measurement problems were not driving our 
results, we re-estimated all of our regressions eliminating outliers.  We did this both by 
eliminating observations with error terms greater than three standard deviations and by 
eliminating observations where exports increased or decreased by more than three standard 
deviations greater than the average growth rate.  This procedure eliminated approximately one 
half of one percent of all our observations.  Both the OLS and the FE estimates results were 
robust to the elimination of outliers.62 
In order to better understand why receiving an ETC is associated with a decline in exports, 
we estimated (both OLS and FE) regressions in which the ETC dummy was replaced by seven 
separate dummy variables: ETCt indicates that an ETC exemption had been received t years 
previously.  This allows us to distinguish between the immediate and longer run impact of the 
ETC.  The OLS results (Table 7, column 1) continue to show a positive impact on exports 
from receiving an ETC exemption, and the size of that impact is fairly stable over time. When 
                                                 
62 A different type of measurement problem could arise because of changes in the industry classification codes 
over time.  The export data are organized by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes until 1988 and by 
NAICS from 1989 on.  To test for measurement problems generated by mismatched export product categories, 
we included a dummy variable for the switch from SIC to NAICS. The dummy variable was not significant.   
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we look at the fixed effects results (Table 7, column 2), the coefficients on the ETC dummies 
are negative, as in the single dummy estimate, but they are not statistically significant.  This 
reinforces our view that ETCs do not cause exports to fall.  In most industries with ETCs, 
there is not sufficient concentration to suspect a strategic reduction in exports.  In other 
industries, where the choice to ask for an ETC exemption reflects a desire to increase exports 
it is inconceivable that the ETC has negative impact on exports.  The ETC is not binding on 
participants; in fact, over half of ETCs are voluntarily relinquished after a period of time. 
Of course, it is possible that different results might be obtained if one looked at the 
exports of the ETC and its member firms, rather than those of the industry as a whole (which 
we are forced to do because of data limitations).  A complete analysis of the impact – positive 
and negative – of the ETC Act would require access to information that Congress has chosen 
to prohibit. 
There is nothing in the analysis that we present here that lends support to the notion that 
ETCs increase exports above what they would be absent an antitrust exemption.  It seems 
unlikely, given their prevalence in unconcentrated industries, that ETCs exercise much, if any, 
market power – either inside or outside the U.S. market.  Thus our results are consistent with 
earlier, more qualitative studies of ETC Act and WP Act antitrust exemptions.  As discussed 
above, most of these studies concluded that the aggregate economic impact of these 
exemptions was small, both in their intended purpose of assisting U.S. industry and in 
promoting the exercise of market power. 
An important caveat to this research is that our analysis only examines U.S. ETCs.  It does 
not necessarily follow that our analysis can be extended to other countries, particularly ones 
with less developed infrastructure for facilitating exports.  In such cases, export exemptions 
for industries with substantial numbers of firms, especially small firms with little history of 
export activity, may well be justified.  However, exemptions for industries that are dominated 
by one or two firms may simply allow the larger firms to retain their position of dominance 
rather than encourage exports by smaller firms. 
Our analysis also excludes ETCs that were granted permission to export “all products,” 
and the regressions cover manufacturing only (excluding agriculture).  It is possible that those 
ETCs with permission to export “all products” are somehow different.  Without more data, it 
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is impossible to know.  It is also possible that the results for agricultural associations would 
differ as well, but our guess is that they would not.  Some of the agricultural ETCs are 
regional associations of many small agricultural units (e.g., Oregon blueberry exporters).  
These ETCs are unlikely to be able to exercise market power in global markets and may well 
benefit from coordinating among themselves so that they are less dependent on intermediaries 
for accessing foreign markets.  On the other hand, some ETC members are very large 
agricultural exporters, and these ETCs may be able to exercise market power.   
VII. Concluding Remarks 
Antitrust exemptions for exports appear to be associated with a small decline in the real 
value of industry exports.  We suspect, but do not have the data to show, that this association 
reflects something about who chooses to get an ETC.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that there 
are cases where ETCs facilitate an increase in industry exports.63  But while the size of this 
increase may be very noticeable to individual member producers, it appears to be swamped by 
other factors in determining aggregate sectoral trends in exports.  Our results are consistent 
with a small contraction of exports resulting from collusive activity among ETC members.  
However, the low levels of concentration, even within the United States, in most sectors with 
ETCs suggest that this is not the correct explanation of our finding.   
The inability to distinguish between these competing explanations of our findings 
illustrates the importance of collecting and making available for analysis more data about the 
activity of firms granted such exemptions.  Without international data, it is also difficult to 
determine whether the analysis presented here is applicable to other countries.  For the United 
States, we would encourage the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Export Trading Company 
Affairs office to publish aggregate data on ETC-facilitated exports on annual basis, to the full 
extent consistent with the ETC Act.  We would also urge Congress to amend the law to permit 
analysis while protecting individual firm confidentiality.  For all countries that provide 
explicit exemptions we urge the collection and dissemination of data that would permit a full 
analysis of the impact of these exemptions.  Those countries that exempt export cartels from 
                                                 
63 For example there is the case of the Virginia Apple Growers Association, an ETC formed by four small apple 
companies, which went from zero exports to exports of $700,000.  (Phone conversation with Jeffrey Anspacher, 
Director, Export Trading Company Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce June 5, 2006; a brief press release on 
the Virginia Apple Growers Association is available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/TD/OETCA/Apples.html.) 
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their competition laws by negative implication, as in the case of the European Union, because 
they restrict application of their laws to activities which affect the domestic market, have 
abdicated any responsibility to assure that their domestic firms abide by rules of fair 
competition in the global market.  Such blanket exemptions also relieve the government from 
monitoring and collecting data on joint export activities.  Much more transparency could be 
achieved without revealing confidential, proprietary information.  Countries that wish to 
continue to provide these exemptions, which are otherwise contrary to the spirit of 
encouraging freer competition, have an obligation to provide researchers and policy analysts 
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CONCENTRATION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES WITH AN ETC:  
COMPARISON OF HHI 1987 & 1997 
 
 





























VALUE OF EXPORTS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES WITH AN ETC, 
ORGANIZED BY 1997 HHI 
 
Exports in Industries with ETCs, 




























Sectoral Distribution of Export Trading Companies 
Sector Number of ETCs 
in Sector 
Percent of all ETCs that are 
in this sector 
Agricultural 31 25% 
Mining & Construction 3 2% 
Manufacturing 111 88% 
Information 3 2% 
Total number of ETCs classified 
by sector 
126 100% 






Prevalence of Export Trading Companies in Manufacturing Sectors  
Sector (3-digit NAICS Code) # 6-digit NAICS in Sector 
# NAICS 
with ETCs 
% NAICS that 
ever had ETC # ETCs in Sector 
Food & Kindred Products (311) 31 14 45% 31 
Tobacco Products (312) 8 5 63% 1 
Textile Mill Products (313 and 314) 15 6 40% 5 
Apparel & Other Textile Products (315) 11 0 0 0 
Lumber & Wood Products (321) 8 4 50% 12 
Furniture & Fixtures (337) 5 0 0 0 
Paper & Allied Products (322) 13 3 23% 3 
Printing & Publishing (323) 2 0 0 0 
Chemical & Allied Products (325) 27 12 44% 12 
Petroleum & Coal Products (324) 3 1 33% 1 
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics (326) 10 2 20% 2 
Leather & Leather Products (316) 10 1 10% 1 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products (327) 23 1 4% 1 
Primary Metal Industries (331) 15 2 13% 4 
Fabricated Metal Industries (332) 23 3 13% 3 
Industrial Machinery (333) 37 13 35% 23 
Electronic & Electric Equipment (334) 26 12 46% 12 
Transportation Equipment (336) 24 5 21% 8 
Instruments & Related Products (335) 20 3 15% 3 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (339) 14 3 21% 7 
Total* 325 90 28% 106 
* Many of these ETCs covered products that fall into several NAICS codes (that is, they export more than one 






Descriptive Statistics for Regression Sample 
(Manufacturing only) 
 
Variable Units Mean StdDev Min Max 
Value of Exports Millions of US $ (base year 2000) 1107.5 2921.3 0.02 47950.8 
Non-U.S. GDP Billions of US $ (base year 2000) 17330.9 3723.4 11718.7 24204.9 
Industry Exchange Rate  424.3 44.1 328.9 548.1 
Is there an ETC in a given 
NAICS? 0/1 0.07 0.26 0 1 
HHI Index (0 to 10,000) 773.8 654.3 14.9 2983.5 






Economic Impact of ETCs 
Dependent variable:  ln(Value of Exports) 






ETC_first 7 years (dummy) 0.691 0.103 6.68 
HHI 0.0001 0.00002 2.09 
ETC Dummy*HHI -0.0001 0.0001 -0.94 
ln(Non-US GDP) 2.033 0.0760 26.77 
Ln(Exchange rate) -1.065 0.163 -6.54 
Constant -12.670 0.997 -12.73 
8764 observations; 3-digit NAICS dummy variables not reported 





Economic Impact of ETCs 
Dependent variable:  ln(Value of Exports) 






ETC_first 7 years (dummy) -0.104 0.049 -2.10 
HHI -0.00007 0.00003 -2.21 
ETC Dummy*HHI 0.00001 0.00005 0.21 
ln(Non-US GDP) 2.034 0.033 61.41 
Ln(Exchange rate) -1.028 0.070 -14.66 
Constant -12.412 0.430 -28.90 
8764 observations; 325 groups (6-digit NAICS) 








Controlling for WP and permission to fix prices 
Dependent variable:  ln(Value of Exports) 
 














HHI 0.00006 (2.07) 
-0.00007 
(-2.25) 















ln(Non-US GDP) 2.033 (26.76) 
2.033 
(61.42) 
Ln(Exchange rate) -1.070 (-6.57) 
-1.030 
(-14.69) 
Constant -12.656 (-12.68) 
-12.394 
(-28.84) 
# observations 8764 8764 
Adj R-squared 0.3298  
R-squared within; 







Fixed effects at 6-







Allowing Impact of ETC to Diminish Over Time 
Dependent variable:  ln(Value of Exports) 
 








ETC1 0.814 (4.72) 
-0.038 
(-0.49) 
ETC2 0.758 (4.35) 
-0.082 
(-1.05) 
ETC3 0.716 (4.11) 
-0.123 
(-1.58) 
ETC4 0.716 (4.12) 
-0.121 
(-1.55) 
ETC5 0.738 (4.24) 
-0.097 
(-1.25) 
ETC6 0.689 (3.94) 
-0.147 
(-1.88) 
ETC7 0.760 (4.32) 
-0.104 
(-1.32) 
HHI 0.00006 (2.15) 
-0.00007 
(-2.22) 
ETC Dummy*HHI -0.0001 (-1.34) 
0.00001 
(0.20) 
ln(Non-US GDP) 2.039 (26.61) 
2.037 
(60.94) 
Ln(Exchange rate) -1.078 (-6.52) 
-1.037 
(-14.55) 
Constant -12.673 (-12.67) 
-12.390 
(-28.75) 
# observations 8764 8764 
Adj R-squared 0.3300  
R-squared within; 







Fixed effects at 6-




Allowing Impact of ETC to Diminish Over Time, Controlling for WP and Price fixing status 
Dependent variable:  ln(Value of Exports) 








ETC1 1.074 (5.00) 
0.087 
(0.88) 
ETC2 1.022 (4.69) 
0.042 
(0.42) 
ETC3 0.980 (4.50) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
ETC4 0.964 (4.50) 
-0.008 
(-0.08) 
ETC5 0.985 (4.60) 
0.016 
(0.16) 
ETC6 0.929 (4.37) 
-0.038 
(0.38) 
ETC7 1.011 (4.66) 
0.010 
(0.10) 
HHI 0.00006 (2.10) 
-0.00007 
(-2.26) 















ln(Non-US GDP) 2.040 (26.62) 
2.038 
(60.99) 
Ln(Exchange rate) -1.091 (-6.60) 
-1.043 
(-14.62) 
Constant -12.598 (-12.59) 
-12.362 
(-28.67) 
# observations 8764 8764 
Adj R-squared 0.3302  
R-squared within; 
between; overall  
0.3196; 0.0612; 
0.0436 
Other notes 3-digit NAICS dummy variables not reported 
Fixed effects at 6-






EXPORTS:  The export data from 1978 to 2001 come from Robert Feenstra’s web page on 
the NBER website at:  http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/. 
The data are disaggregated by trading partner and product code.  We aggregated across 
trading partners to create a variable measuring total exports by the United States by product 
code.  Data from 2001 to 2004 are from the Census Bureau website, International Trade 
Statistics section, at:  http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/index.html.   
Prior to 1989, the data are organized by Standard Industrial Classification.  From 1989 
forward, they are organized by North American Industrial Classification.  In order to create a 
consistent series, we have reorganized all export data into NAICS.  While we have tried to 
preserve a mapping into six-digit NAICS, in some cases this was not possible and data have 
been aggregated to the five-digit level. 
WORLD GDP:  World and non-U.S. GDP, in real 2000 U.S. dollars, come from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture website at:       
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealGDPValues.xls 
EXPORTS PRICE INDEX:  Industry exports are deflated by an overall exports price index 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, at:  http://www.bls.gov/mxp.  The base year of the price 
index is 2000.  
INDUSTRY EXCHANGE RATE INDEX:  The industry specific exchange rate data through 
2002 come from Linda Goldberg’s web page on the New York Federal Reserve Bank: 
 http://www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/goldberg/papers.html.   
Data were taken from the “Database on Industry-Specific Exchange Rates.” We used the tab 
containing annual industry-specific export-weighted real exchange rates in manufacturing.  
Industries are identified by 2-digit SIC codes.  Goldberg generously provided us with data 
from 2003 and 2004.  We use Goldberg’s mapping of 2-digit SIC industries to 3-digit NAICS 
industries to match these data to our export data. 
HHI INDEX OF INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION:  HHI data are published every five years.  
We use the value of shipments HHI for 1987 and 1997.  (The 1997 HHI numbers are also 
available in value added terms, but the 1987 data were based on value of shipments.)   
Industry data for 1997 come from the U.S. Census, at:  
 http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html   
Historical U.S. Census data are available at:  
 http://www.wooster.edu/economics/archive/indconc.html.   
All NAICS observations for 1978-1991 are assigned the corresponding HHI for 1987.  All 
NAICS observations for 1992 through 2004 are assigned the corresponding HHI for 1997.   
Prior to 1997, concentration ratios are only reported using the SIC industry codes, all NAICS 
observations before 1992 are matched to their corresponding SIC industry number using 
NAICS-SIC concordance available at:  http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm. 
